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Omri Yadlint
Building on McChesney's political extortion model of rent ex-
traction, Rob Sitkoff offers new, innovative contributions to the lit-
erature on corporate political speech.2 This Commentary addresses
only one segment of Sitkoff's Article, the one that applies McChes-
ney's theory to the debate on the efficiency of the market for corpo-
rate charters. The main goal of this Commentary is to clarify Sitkoff's
argument and examine its limits. I begin with a short introduction on
the economics of regulation, which I believe is essential to
understanding Sitkoff's Article as well as this Commentary. The next
three parts of my Commentary examine Sitkoff's main claim, namely,
that Delaware's dominance in the market for corporate law may be
explained by the weak extortion power that Delaware's legislators
hold vis-h-vis corporations and by its liberal campaign finance laws. I
conclude with an analysis of Sitkoff's objection to federal corporate
law and, in particular, to Bebchuk and Ferrell's call for an optional
federal takeover law.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:
FROM GEORGE STIGLER TO ROB SITKOFF, THROUGH MANCUR
OLSON AND FRED MCCHESNEY
A. Stigler
Traditional economics treated regulation as a black box aimed at
fixing market failures and redistributing wealth. Public choice theo-
rists, mainly in the second half of the twentieth century, started to
show interest in the way governments operate. One of the pioneers in
this area is George Stigler. Under Stigler's model, firms compete for
f Professor, The Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University. I thank Rob Sitkoff for his
valuable comments on this Commentary.
1 See generally Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing (Harvard 1997). See also notes
7-10 and accompanying text.
2 See Robert H. Sitkoff Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competi-
tion for Corporate Charters, 69 U Chi L Rev 1103 (2002).
3 This Commentary does not address the first two parts of Sitkoff's Article, discussing the
rationale for the federal ban on contributions to campaign finance.
4 Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regula-
tory Competition, 87 Va L Rev 111, 143 (2001) (suggesting that an optional federal takeover law
will enhance shareholder choice and, therefore, should be supported by all scholars who endorse
competition for corporate charters).
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rents in the political market and politicians sell rents to the highest
bidder. One important insight from Stigler's model is that the ineffi-
ciencies of regulation stem not only from its interference with the effi-
cient operation of the market, but also from the fact that it encourages
firms to waste resources in the search for rents.
B. Olson
Mancur Olson supplements Stigler's model with the observation
that the market for regulation operates in favor of interest groups that
6can more cheaply organize to lobby for regulation. Thus, for example,
due to free-riding problems, consumers have difficulty organizing to
lobby for price caps; producers, on the other hand, are relatively few in
number and can therefore easily form a lobby for a law prescribing a
minimum price.
C. McChesney
McChesney's model builds upon Stigler's and Olson's models, but
presents a mirror image: Market agents pay ransom in response to leg-
islators' threats to extract rents.7 The difference between McChesney's
and Stigler's models seems semantic in nature, but I believe there is
more to it than meets the eye. While under Stigler's model, producers
are the entrepreneurs in the market for legislation and legislators are
passive actors, under McChesney's model, legislators are portrayed as
entrepreneurs and firms respond to their threats.8 In Stigler's model,
legislators create and sell rents; in McChesney's model, on the other
hand, legislators threaten to extract rents. Whereas Stigler and Olson
suggest that consumers are disadvantaged by their lack of organiza-
tion, McChesney argues that consumers' lack of organization is to
their advantage, arguably even premeditated, because it protects them
from extortion.9 Likewise, whereas Stigler's model views consumers
and producers as rivals who compete for rents, according to McChes-
5 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt SCI 3, 12
(1971).
6 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
141-43 (Harvard 1965). In fact, Olson's book came out a few years before Stigler's paper.
7 McChesney summarizes the innovation of his book: "The ability of the politician to gain,
not by creating rents for some but by causing losses to others, has never been considered .... That
is the subject of the rest of this book." McChesney, Money for Nothing at 19 (cited in note 1).
8 "The rent-extraction model focuses specifically on politicians. It views them not as mere
brokers redistributing wealth in response to competing private demands, but as independent ac-
tors making their own demands to which private actors respond." Id.
9 "Under existing models, greater interest-group organization is unambiguously good. But
this interpretation is incorrect, or at least incomplete.... Group organization lowers politicians'
transaction costs. The resulting lower costs of extracting surplus mean that more extractive regu-
lation will be threatened, and so more surplus lost." Id at 151.
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ney, consumers and producers may be equally extorted by politicians'
threats to introduce new taxes or to limit production."
D. Sitkoff on Campaign Finance
As Sitkoff shows very persuasively in Parts II.B and II.D of his
Article, both the Stigler and McChesney models can explain corpora-
tions' support for bans on contributions to political campaigns." Un-
der Stigler's scheme, such bans operate like a cartel to restrict compe-
tition in the market for regulation and, therefore, serve the interests of
all bidders in the regulatory auction market.2 Under McChesney's
model, on the other hand, organized interest groups support bans on
contributions because such bans protect them from shakedowns. 3 One
might easily demonstrate the distinction between the two models by
taking the extreme example of only one organized interest group op-
erating in society. Under Stigler's model, this interest group would not
be interested in any restriction on contributions; under McChesney's
model, in contrast, even this solo interest group might need protection
from extortion, and it would therefore lobby for a ban on contribu-
tions.
E. Sitkoff on State Competition for Corporate Charters (and the
Organization of This Commentary)
But Sitkoff's main innovations, the ones I address in this Com-
mentary, are his attempts to mobilize McChesney's rent extraction
theory into the debate on state competition in the market for incorpo-
ration. Sitkoff's primary claim is that Delaware's dominance in the
market for corporate law may be explained by the weak extortion
power that Delaware's legislators possess vis-a-vis corporations. Sit-
koff attributes this weakness mainly to the fact that Delaware legisla-
tors have no other interest group to which to turn for contributions
10 "Unlike the rent-creating version of economic regulation, the rent-extraction model
notes that producers and consumers are often affected alike by threats to regulate. As already-
organized producers repurchase more of their own surplus by buying off legislators' threats of
taxation, they are simultaneously repurchasing consumer surplus for their buyers." Id at 152.
11 In Part I of his Article, Sitkoff shows that popular explanations for these bans, such as
the protection of shareholders from managers or the protection of the political process, are not
theoretically sound and cannot explain the historical evidence of managers' support for these
bans.
12 Obviously, politicians who auction these bans charge a price for this product; the losers
are the future politicians who will find it more difficult to charge a price for the rents they create
or for retreating from their threats to extract rents.
13 McChesney, Money for Nothing at 168 (cited in note 1) ("Contribution limits, often cou-
pled with proposals for public funding of candidates, are often offered as a way out of the cur-
rent morass in which politicians can shake down private parties for contributions in lieu of ex-
propriating even more from them.").
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other than Delaware firms-Part II of this Commentary addresses this
claim. The second claim about Delaware's attraction that Sitkoff
makes, to be addressed in Part III of this Commentary, is that Dela-
ware's liberal campaign laws, coupled with the weak extortion position
of Delaware's legislators, allow firms to engage in rent seeking with-
out the fear of being subject to shakedowns. Another source for
Delaware legislators' weakness that Sitkoff points at, to be examined
in Part IV of this Commentary, is the procedural limitations that
Delaware's constitution and norms impose on initiatives to amend
Delaware's General Corporation Law. Finally, in Part V of this Com-
mentary, I analyze Sitkoff's claims regarding the implications of his
theory for the debate on the desirability of a federal takeover law."
II. WEAK LEGISLATORS CONSTITUTE A STRONG LEGISLATURE
According to Sitkoff, firms opt to incorporate in Delaware in part
because Delaware's legislators are in a relatively weak position to ex-
tort corporations. At the same time, Sitkoff argues, Delaware's rela-
tively liberal rules on campaign financing allow corporations to influ-
ence Delaware's legislators.' To put Sitkoffs argument in McChes-
ney's jargon, Delaware corporations feel safe to lobby Delaware's
politicians for rent creation (Stigler's model) without subjecting them-
selves to extortive threats of rent extraction (McChesney's model).
The main source of weakness for Delaware's legislators, accord-
ing to Sitkoff, is the fact that no other significant industry operates in
Delaware.6 Sitkoff explains:
Extortive threats by Delaware legislators ... are less credible
than similar extortive threats by legislators in other states. Credi-
ble extortive threats require independent alternative consumers
of legislation, and with respect to corporate law, Delaware legis-
lators have few alternative interest group sponsors. On the fed-
eral level and in most other states, in contrast, there are numer-
ous interest groups that regularly compete with managers on
corporate law issues, perhaps most importantly labor.'7
This claim adds an important element to Romano's credible
commitment explanation for Delaware's dominance.'8 Whereas
14 My Commentary does not address Part IV.B of Sitkoff's Article, in which he applies his
theory to the debate on issuer choice.
15 Delaware's rules on campaign finance are more liberal than other states but are still
quite restrictive. See Sitkoff, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1144 n 169 (cited in note 2).
16 Another important source of weakness that Sitkoff points at is the procedural limita-
tions on the amendment of the Delaware General Corporation Law. I address this source in Part
IV of this Commentary.
17 Sitkoff 69 U Chi L Rev at 1143-44 (cited in note 2) (footnotes omitted).
18 Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L Rev
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Romano's focus is on the interests of the Delaware legislature, Sitkoff
points at the weak extortion position of the Delaware legislators as an
explanation for why these legislators do not sabotage Delaware legis-
lature's goal. In Sitkoff's words:
The traditional account of Delaware's credible commitment,
which is most closely associated with Professor Roberta Romano, fo-
cuses on Delaware's relative dependence on franchise tax reve-
nue as well as its extensive and sunk investment in legal and judi-
cial capital.... But this account represents an oversimplification
of the political process. Individual legislators cannot fully inter-
nalize the benefits of increased tax revenues, which are in effect a
public good."
Sitkoff's claim may also provide a more general contribution to
local government theory, far beyond its contribution to the literature
on the market for corporate charters. His claim implies that local gov-
ernments that offer their residents a bundle of public goods would be
less competitive than local governments that offer only one public
good."
I examine Sitkoff's claim in four stages. First, I show that as long
as the interest groups operating in a state are not competing with one
another, it is not clear whether firms would prefer to incorporate in a
state that hosts fewer or more groups. Second, I argue that even when
interest groups do compete firms cannot escape extortion by incorpo-
rating in a state that does not host competing interest groups. Third, I
argue that competing interest groups do operate in Delaware. Fourth,
I show that Sitkoff's argument is strengthened by introducing voting
power into the model.
A. Does One Interest Group Do Better than Two Noncompeting
Interest Groups?
Consider a federal system with only two identical states and two
organized interest groups with the two interest groups facing the di-
lemma of whether to operate in the same state or to operate in differ-
ent states. Their only consideration is the minimization of political ex-
tortion.
709, 721-33 (1987) (suggesting that Delaware's dependence on franchise revenues and its sunk
investment in servicing Delaware firms provides a credible signal for Delaware's commitment to
continue servicing the interests of firms incorporated in Delaware).
19 Sitkofft 69 U Chi L Rev at 1141 (cited in note 2).
20 The question of whether it would be more efficient to have fewer large local govern-
ments, each providing several services, or many more governments, each providing one service,
has been addressed by others, but from a different angle. See, for example, Robert D. Cooter, The
Strategic Constitution 120-24 (Princeton 2000).
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In this section I examine the case in which the two interest groups
do not compete; namely, rents extracted from one interest group do
not benefit the other, and vice versa. Nevada, with its strong gambling
industry and relatively large number of incorporated firms, provides a
good example for this setting of two noncompeting interest groups:
Legislation that benefits (harms) the gambling industry may harm
(benefit) Nevada gamblers or residents, but it probably has no effect
on firms incorporated in Nevada. Similarly, any amendment to Nevada
corporate law that runs against or promotes the interests of firms in-
corporated in Nevada will have no effect on the gambling industry.
Arguably, and contrary to Sitkoff's initial claim, the two interest
groups would minimize their susceptibility to extortion by operating
in the same state. Assuming the number of robbers in a dark alley is
constant and that each robber can rob only one person at a time, the
prospects of being robbed in this alley decline with the number of
people walking in the alley. Similarly, assuming there is a certain limit
on the dollar amount that legislators actually need for their cam-
paigns, the two interest groups will be better off splitting the costs or
the risk of being extorted by the legislators of one state.
But one can look at this problem from a different angle and reach
the opposite conclusion, as I believe Sitkoff does:
In reply one might argue that if Delaware legislators have no-
where else to turn, they will focus their rent extraction on corpo-
rations. But such efforts would be hampered by the lack of lever-
age stemming from the absence of alternative interest group pa-
trons.'
The problem that Sitkoff probably points at is the credibility
shortage from which extortionists often suffer. If a threatener does not
benefit from acting upon his threat, the target of the threat will not as-
cribe any credibility to the threat. In our context, we may describe the
problem in the following way: When only one interest group is operat-
ing in the state, legislators derive no gain from extracting rents from
that group. In fact, extracting rents from that group will reduce the
wealth of that group and, therefore, will constrict the main source of
funds on which legislators can rely for contributions. The fact that leg-
islators gain nothing and may even lose from acting upon a threat to
extract rents impedes the credibility of their threat.2
The fact that few noncompeting interest groups operate in a state
does not reduce the adverse effect that such rent extraction may have
21 Sitkoff 69 U Chi L Rev at 1143 (cited in note 2).
22 In contrast, if for some reason legislators do benefit from moving against the only inter-
est group in town, they may find it hard to convey a credible commitment not to act upon their
threat after the interest group has supported their campaign.
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on the resources of potential patrons.2 But the fact that more than one
interest group is around may increase the politician's cost of not carry-
ing out the threat. Assuming the threatener publicizes the threat, the
target (interest group) knows that retreating from the threat would
hurt the threatener's credibility in the eyes of the other potential tar-
gets of extortion. Similarly, when contributions are publicized, acting
against the interests of contributors would impair a legislator's future
ability to raise funds from other groups. Thus, a legislator facing sev-
eral interest groups will find it easier to convince targets of extortion
that he will act upon the threat if they do not pay and that he will not
act against them after they have contributed to his campaign.
The argument that one interest group cannot be credibly extorted
seems, however, overstated. The important factor that determines
credibility is not the number of potential targets for extortion, but the
infinite horizon of extortion incidents the legislator faces. If legislators
face only two potential targets for extortion and can extort each group
only once, the first target of extortion will know that at the next stage
the legislators will face the endgame in which they can make no credi-
ble threat. Thus, the threat to extort the first interest group is actually
the last extortion game they play, which, for the same reason, will not
carry much credibility either. Whether legislators face one or two in-
terest groups, therefore, they may be able to earn credibility only by
establishing long-term extortion relationships with the interest groups
they extort. As in any prisoner's dilemma game, playing repeatedly
helps create an environment of trust and credibility. The larger the
number of interest groups in a state, the easier it would be for its legis-
lators to create such an infinite horizon, but that does not mean that
such long-term relationships cannot be established with one interest
group.
We may conclude, therefore, that there is a payoff: the more in-
terest groups operating in a state, the lower the probability of any one
of them being subject to extortion, but the higher the credibility of
each extortion. Thus, the mere fact that Nevada hosts the gambling in-
dustry cannot explain why most firms prefer Delaware over Nevada.u
23 This proposition holds only as long as the interest groups involved are not competing.
The case of competing interest groups is analyzed below.
24 In the conference version of his Article, Sitkoff made the following claim (now deleted):
Consider Nevada, the would-be "Delaware of the West." Nevada has (albeit imperfectly)
mimicked Delaware's corporate code and at the same time has declined to treat corporate
campaign spending differently than that of individuals.... Yet in Nevada there exist power-
ful competitors to managers in the market for legislation, such as the gambling industry,
which increases the exposure to legislative shakedowns.
Following this Commentary, Sitkoff now concedes that the Nevada example does not serve his
argument and he focuses only on states with competing interest groups like New York-I ad-
dress the case of these states in the next Part. Indeed, Sitkoff may even claim that the absence of
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B. The Case of Two Competing Interest Groups
The argument that extortion power increases with the number of
interest groups is more convincing when the interest groups do com-
pete, namely, when legislation that benefits one interest group harms
the other, and vice versa. First, when two interest groups compete, leg-
islators can use one initiative to extort both groups. Hence, assuming
the initiation of legislative reforms is costly, legislators would find it
cheaper to extort competing interest groups. Second, and more impor-
tantly, when the two interest groups are competing, the rents extracted
from one group are transferred to the other group.1 Consequently, a
threatened interest group knows that the benefiting interest group
would reward the threatener. The fact that the threatener benefits
from acting upon his threat attaches credibility to the threat.
Corporations and labor unions are one example: labor unions
tend to support minimum wage laws that corporations tend to oppose.
Corporations would lobby for laws that will allow them to maximize
net present value, while labor representatives would prefer corporate
statutes that restrict firm risk-taking. Similarly, labor groups often op-
pose takeover laws that firms support, and vice versa.2 In Sitkoff's
words:
Thus, just as the lack of competing lobbies in Delaware means
that investors and managers need not fear efforts by others to
obtain legislative rents at their expense through the enactment of
private interest provisions in the corporate code (the traditional
economic model of regulation), the lack of competing lobbies in
Delaware means that investors and managers need not worry
about extortive ultimatums by politicians either (the McChesney
model). In New York, however, not only is there exposure to rent
seeking by labor unions in the form of, say, large-shareholder
statutory liability for for employee wages, there is also exposure
to rent extraction by politicians in the form of threats to enact
such provisions.
Now suppose that for some historical reason, all the labor force in
our two-state federal system is concentrated in one state (for example,
New York), to be called the labor state. Firms may choose whether to
competing interest groups operating in Nevada may explain the fact that Nevada wins the silver
medal in the race for corporate charters.
2 "Extraction of private rents and creation of political rents need not be mutually exclu-
sive strategies for politicians. Maximum gains for legislators may involve a combination of the
two." McChesney, Money for Nothing at 34 (cited in note 1).
26 For a vivid description of such a battle between labor groups and firms, see Romano, 8
Cardozo L Rev at 726-27 (cited in note 18).
27 Sitkoff; 69 U Chi L Rev at 1143 (cited in note 2) (footnotes omitted).
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incorporate in the labor state or in the second state, in which no com-
peting interest group is operating (for example, Delaware). At a first
glance it seems they would prefer to incorporate in the second state.
As Sitkoff suggests, if corporations choose to incorporate in the labor
state, they will be making themselves subject to legislators who can pit
the two interest groups against each other. Indeed, Sitkoff suggests
that the source of Delaware's attraction is in the fact that Delaware
does not regulate labor relationships or any other market activity:
[T]he point is that Delaware is not in the business of regulating
the ongoing business activities of the firms it charters, so a Dela-
ware legislator cannot pit one set of managers against
another .... In contrast, a federal legislator who sits on a commit-
tee that superintends, say, the telecommunications industry, could
easily pit MCI against AT&T and hold up both for donations.2
As we have shown, the argument that legislators' threats are
more credible when they face competing interest groups is, of course,
logical.2 The question, however, is whether it can help explain Dela-
ware's dominance in the market for incorporation. One point of doubt
is that even if legislators can better extort when they can pit one inter-
est group against another, it seems they can do so just as well when
the other interest group is located in a different state.3 If firms incor-
porate in the labor state-the state that regulates their employment
market-legislators in the labor state will be able to pit labor groups
against corporations by threatening to amend both corporate law and
labor law. On the other hand, if firms incorporate in the second state,
the state in which no competing interest groups reside, the legislators
of the labor state will still be able to extort the two groups by initiat-
ing amendments to employment law, and legislators of the second
state will now be able to threaten both interest groups with corporate
law amendments.
Hence, as long as there are no restrictions on out-of-state cam-
paign contributions, it is not at all clear that incorporating in a state
with no competing interest groups like Delaware will reduce the level
28 Id at 1149.
29 See note 25 and accompanying text.
30 Indeed, Sitkoff seems to ignore the extortion power Delaware legislators may have vis-
A-vis foreign interest groups. As long as there is no prohibition on contributions from foreign
sources, it seems that foreign interest groups may have an interest in the Delaware General Cor-
poration Law, and this interest may not necessarily align with those of Delaware firms. Thus,
even if we assume that all firms share the same interest, an issue to which I will return, there are
reasons to assume that other interest groups, perhaps operating and incorporated outside of
Delaware, may have opposing interests. Suppose, for example, that all firms incorporated in
Delaware want hermetic protection against hostile takeovers. Investment bankers, which special-
ize in planning and financing hostile bidding wars, would certainly oppose laws that provide such
protection. Delaware's legislators can take advantage of this conflict and extort the two groups.
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of extortion to which firms are exposed. Again, assuming a certain
limit on the dollar amount politicians actually need, it may even be ar-
gued that corporations will be better off incorporating in the same
state that regulates their activities in the employment market or the
product market, like New York, than subjecting themselves to extor-
tion threats coming from two groups of legislators-for example, New
York's and Delaware's legislators.
C. Is There Only One Interest Group in Delaware?
One reason firms in Delaware may feel better protected from ex-
tortion than anywhere else is the fact that Delaware hosts the largest
number of firms. As shown above, the larger the number of firms, the
lower any one firm's exposure to extortion.3' Hence, irrespective of
why Delaware was able to gain a leading position in the market for
corporate charters, once it gained this position, other firms had an in-
centive to follow simply because of the large number of firms already
there.
Against this explanation one can argue that the large number of
firms may also support the credibility of legislators' threats, because it
provides an infinite horizon of extortion opportunities. According to
this argument, the fact that so many firms are incorporated in Dela-
ware increases the risk of extortion firms are exposed to in Delaware.
But legislators would be able to take advantage of the large crowd of
firms only if they could differentiate between firms. If legislators could
promote an initiative that would run against the interests of one firm
or a small group of firms, leaving other firms untouched or better off,
such an initiative could be a "milker" that would draw the interested
parties into paying the entrepreneur behind this legislation. If all firms
in Delaware share exactly the same interests, however, it will be im-
possible to generate a milker that would force one or a few firms to
jump in and pay the ransom needed. Due to free-riding problems,
firms would not be extorted.3
31 A similar claim, although from a Stiglerian perspective, was made by Roberta Romano,
The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va L Rev 111, 141 (1987): "[B]ecause hundreds of
large corporations are domiciled, though not headquartered, in Delaware, no one firm has [ ]
substantial political influence." Romano bases her argument (that Delaware is attractive because
of the large number of firms incorporated in Delaware) on other grounds as well. See Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J L, Econ, & Org 225,
276-78 (1985) (suggesting that the large specific investment by Delaware in servicing Delaware
firms signals a strong commitment of Delaware to cater to firms' interest, a signal that other
states cannot mimic). See also Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 723 (cited in note 18) (suggesting
that the large number of firms increases the volume of case law and, therefore, creates a more
predictable legal system).
32 See note 9.
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The assumption that all Delaware firms share the same interests
is, therefore, crucial to Sitkoff's argument. Indeed, Sitkoff claims that
Delaware firms share similar preferences:
In Delaware, moreover, with the possible exception of takeover
statutes-it is home to potential bidders and targets-corporate
demand for legislation is more or less homogenous. Therefore
this is not a claim that all managers of Delaware corporations
want precisely identical law .... Rather the point is that Delaware
is not in the business of regulating the ongoing business activities
of the firms incorporated there, so a Delaware legislator cannot
pit one set of managers against another.33
As shown in the previous section, however, the mere fact that
Delaware "is not in the business of regulating ongoing activities" does
not make Delaware firms more extortion-proof than firms incorpo-
rated in states that do regulate business activities. Thus, for example, a
firm that does business in New York cannot escape New York regula-
tors' extortion by incorporating in Delaware. In other words, moving
from one state to another can only affect the exposure of corporations
to threats to amend corporate law. The interesting question, therefore,
is whether there is any reason to believe that demand for corporate
law is more homogenous in Delaware than elsewhere. Sitkoff himself
recognizes as an exception the fact that bidders and targets, both resi-
dents of Delaware, have different, probably conflicting, preferences
for takeover law.4 But this is not a trivial exception. Takeover law is
the main area of law in which states take different stands. The conflict
of interests between potential targets and bidders invites political
pressures. The conflicts and the pressures intensify in the midst of an
actual fight for corporate control.3 Moreover, the conflicting interests
in takeover law are not only between bidders and targets, but also be-
tween labor unions, investment bankers, and other groups who may be
affected by changes in Delaware takeover law.3 As shown in the pre-
33 Sitkoff, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1147 (cited in note 2).
34 In fact, as shown in the previous section, see Part II.B, even if only targets were incorpo-
rated in Delaware and all bidders were incorporated elsewhere, the extortion power of Delaware
legislators would still not be weakened, for they can extort out-of-state bidders just as well as
state bidders or targets.
35 For a nice illustration of such conflicts and pressures, see Romano, 73 Va L Rev at
120-36 (cited in note 31) (discussing the lobbying efforts and political processes behind Con-
necticut's adoption of a second-generation takeover statute in 1984).
36 The story of the Battle of the Erie is probably the most famous in this regard. See Ed-
ward B. Rock, Encountering the Scarlet Woman of Wall Street" Speculative Comments at the End
of the Century, 2 Theor Inq in L 237,239-48 (2001) (reviewing the fight between Cornelius Van-
derbilt, Daniel Drew, and Jay Gould for control of the Erie Railroad).
37 Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 730-31 (cited in note 18):
Delaware is better able to resist political pressures for takeover laws because of the large
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vious section, the fact that some of these interest groups do not oper-
ate or incorporate in Delaware should not stop Delaware legislators
from exercising their extortion "rights" against them.
Moreover, corporations in Delaware may have different prefer-
ences with regard to issues other than takeover laws. In fact, the prem-
ise of homogeneity in firms' preferences seems very problematic in
light of the fact that firms adopt different charters and different capi-
tal and organizational structures. Thus, there seems to be no reason to
assume they would all agree on the same law. Sitkoff's answer to that
claim would probably be that as long as Delaware corporate law is
liberal enough to allow firms to adopt such different charters or struc-
tures, they can all agree on the same statute.3 But this response takes
Delaware's liberal approach for granted. The fact that the current
Delaware General Corporation Law is so liberal does not mean that a
"milker" cannot be put to floor, which will outlaw (or mandate) cer-
tain provisions that few firms have (or do not have) in their bylaws.
Consider, for example, a trivial initiative to prohibit the dual role
many chief executives play when they serve as the firm's chairman of
the board as well. 9 Clearly, only agents who play such a dual role will
be willing to pay the ransom needed to cool down such an initiative.
Firms in which such separation of powers is already in place would not
find such an initiative offensive. Or consider a more material initiative,
one that threatens to amplify the duty of care standards. Such an
amendment in Delaware law would impose higher costs on high-risk
firms than it would on low-risk firms. Since firms incorporated in
Delaware differ in their exposure to risk, such an initiative would sin-
gle out the high-risk firms. Corporations may also hold different views
regarding the regulation of self-dealing. Whereas parent corporations
would probably be threatened by an initiative to restrict their freedom
to compete or deal with their subsidiaries, firms with dispersed owner-
ship might find such restrictions favorable as they make them less at-
tractive for takeover by looters.
The conflict of interests between firms and financial intermediar-
ies also is not restricted to takeover laws. Financial intermediaries are
interested mainly in increasing volume of trade and, therefore, would
lobby for laws that promote market liquidity. Firms, on the other hand,
may be more interested in the efficiency of their production lines.
number of incorporated firms, which includes both acquirers and targets... In addition,
other interested parties who oppose restricting takeovers, such as financial intermediaries,
would find it more worthwhile to lobby in Delaware than in other states because its statute
would have a greater impact on acquisitions, as it would apply to so many firms.
38 Sitkof 69 U Chi L Rev at 1147 (cited in note 2).
39 Such a rule was recently adopted in Israel and was vigorously opposed by CEOs, who
play this dual role.
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Thus, for example, firms and financial intermediaries may hold differ-
ent views regarding the regulation of proxy contests or insider trad-
ing.40
Lastly, one obvious area of conflicting interests is the franchise
tax. As Kahan and Kamar have shown very convincingly, the current
structure of Delaware's franchise tax discriminates against large pub-
licly held firms.' Any initiative to shift the burden from large to small
firms could be used as a "milker" that would extort both large and
small firms.
We may conclude, therefore, that the lack of extortion in Dela-
ware cannot be explained by firms' homogenous demand for legisla-
tion.4 The fact that so many firms can operate under the same regime
is not due to the firms' homogenous demands but rather to the ena-
bling philosophy of Delaware corporate law, which permits each firm
to adopt the contractual terms that fit its needs.
D. The Importance of Voting Power
As we have seen so far, the main deficiency in Sitkoff's thesis is
the lack of a clear model explaining why the lack of another strong in-
terest group operating in Delaware reduces the extortion power that
Delaware legislators possess against Delaware corporations. The fact
that other states host more interest groups, readily available for extor-
tion, seems an insufficient explanation, especially given that legislators
in Delaware could initiate amendments that would divide the universe
of firms incorporated in Delaware into many subgroups, conquer and
40 See David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand:A Private Inter-
est Mode with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J L & Econ 311,327-30 (1987).
41 Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law,
86 Cornell L Rev 1205,1218-25 (2001).
42 Sitkoff answers my argument as follows:
Professor Yadlin suggests that Delaware legislators could attempt to "divide and conquer"
by introducing amendments on divisive issues of corporate law. But that threat is more hy-
pothetical than real. There is a strong legislative norm in Delaware in favor of deference to
the Corporate Law Section of the Bar Association, and amendments to the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law are recommended only "when there is a demonstrable consensus in
the corporate community that such changes are advisable." It is therefore likely that none
of Professor Yadlin's hypothetical divide-and-conquer proposals would ever get before the
legislature. In effect, issues of Delaware corporate law for which there is no strong consen-
sus-the sort of issues that would invite rent seeking and political rent extraction-are
punted to the Delaware courts. This further reduces the potential for traditional rent seek-
ing and political rent extraction.
Sitkoff; 69 U Chi L Rev at 1145-46 (cited in note 2) (footnotes omitted). In other words, Sitkoff
suggests that even if the weakness of Delaware legislators cannot be explained by the search
preferences of Delaware firms, there is an alternative source for this weakness-the procedural
limitations on the amendment of the Delaware General Corporation Law. I address this claim in
Part IV of this Commentary.
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extort them, or could pit out-of-state interest groups against Delaware
firms.
Moreover, if the fact that legislators regulate other industries-
like gambling in Nevada or the financial industry or labor unions in
New York-were of major concern to firms, it would seem that Ne-
vada and New York could compete with Delaware by forming an ad-
ditional, independent legislature responsible only for corporate law.
Much like boards of education regulating public education, states
could have a separate, independent legislative body devoted only to
regulating corporate law. Legislators in such a corporate-law-oriented
legislature would arguably be in a very similar position to that of
Delaware's legislators.
The missing link in Sitkoff's rent extraction explanation for
Delaware's dominance, I believe, is the significance of voting power. If
we ignore voting power, Delaware and New York legislators are in the
same position to take advantage of the effect of their corporate laws
on corporations, labor unions, and financial intermediaries to extort
them no matter where the labor unions or financial intermediaries
operate. Voting power changes the equation. The credibility legislators
derive from the popularity of their actions against corporations is de-
pendent on the existence of a competing interest group with voting
power inside the state. In states in which the interests of many voters
conflict with those of firms, therefore, legislators may gain popularity
among voters by extracting rents from firms. Thus, the threat of rent
extraction is more credible in states in which such competing interest
groups actually reside and vote.
The voting story implies that threats of rent extraction are credi-
ble only in states in which a large constituency with significant voting
power resides, and whose interests are in sharp conflict with the inter-
ests of firms. Consider the case of New York. As I have shown, if we
were to ignore voting and if the legislator game were all about the
money, it seems Delaware legislators could pit targets against bidders
and against financial institutions just as effectively as New York legis-
lators do. What makes New York legislators' threats against targets
more credible is the fact that employees of financial institutions and
the labor force of many Delaware firms, who may benefit from certain
anti-target amendments, reside and vote in New York." Thus, acting
upon such threats may provide New York legislators with votes that
Delaware legislators cannot gain. The threat of New York legislators,
43 For a similar argument, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State
Competition and the New Trend toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 Cardozo L Rev




therefore, is more credible than threats coming from Delaware legisla-
tors."
Voting, therefore, can explain why firms prefer Delaware to New
York or California. It cannot provide any reasonable explanation for
why the existence of a gambling industry in Nevada should have
pushed firms away from Nevada to Delaware. As long as there are no
conflicts of interest between employees or customers of the gambling
industry and the interests of firms incorporated in Nevada, the threat
of Nevada legislators to extract rents from firms would not benefit
Nevada voters and thus would not be credible.4 5
The voting story, therefore, can explain why Delaware wins the
race against states like New York and California. It cannot explain
why Nevada, and other states in which no competing constituency re-
sides, are left behind Delaware. But arguably, once Delaware gained
its dominance, voting could explain why Delaware kept and expanded
its dominance. The fact that a large number of firms were incorpo-
rated in Delaware created whole industries specializing in the provi-
sion of services to these firms. Thus, in addition to the fact that no
competing interest groups reside in Delaware, this state also has the
advantage of having a large constituency whose main interest is in ex-
panding the number of firms incorporated in Delaware. 4 Hence, for a
Delaware legislator, the cost of acting upon a threat of extracting rents
from firms is much larger than it is for a Nevada or other state legisla-
tor.
The argument that the large number of firms incorporated in
Delaware can explain its dominance is not novel. As Roberta Romano
44 Notice that New York legislators cannot credibly commit to refrain from extorting firms
simply by forming a single-purpose legislative body, dedicated solely to corporate law. As long as
legislators are elected to this body from the same population and are dependant on the same
voters for reelection, their threats are just as credible as the threats of legislators in the all-
purpose legislature.
45 See Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 762-63 (cited in note 43):
Another distinctive fact about Delaware as a jurisdiction is the relative absence of counter-
vailing lobbies. In California, which probably has the most "activist," least lax body of cor-
porate law, the law-making process may involve a number of contending groups: labor, en-
vironmentalists, public-interest lobbies, etc. But Delaware is sparsely populated and hence
resembles a relative vacuum in terms of interest groups. It is interesting to note that Dela-
ware shares this characteristic with Nevada (the "Delaware of the West"), which also has
competed successfully for charters. The common denominator is that both states can con-
centrate on marketing their corporate law to consumers because there is little inherent in-
terest in the topic among their citizens. In contrast, the labor unions in New York have had
a clear impact on the New York Business Corporation Law, as evidenced by its unique
provision for large-shareholder liability for wages.
46 Id at 762 ("Nor is it only lawyers who are affected [in the absence of countervailing
pressures]. Delaware's corporate preeminence supports satellite industries. For example, Wil-
mington hotels are filled with out-of-state litigators preparing to argue in the Chancery Court.
Additionally, Delaware residents are employed by corporate service firms.").
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and others argued long ago, the large specific investments that Dela-
ware's government and citizens made in servicing Delaware firms
would be lost if those firms left Delaware, thus signaling the state's
strong commitment to cater to the firms' interests. 7 States that have
not made such investments cannot mimic Delaware's signal. Sitkoff's
rent-extraction explanation for Delaware's dominance supplements
Romano's by arguing that the same specific investments can also ex-
plain why Delaware legislators cannot credibly threaten to extract
rents from firms-voters' preference for catering to the interests of
firms increases the costs of acting upon such threats and, therefore,
undermines their credibility. The fact that Delaware legislators cannot
benefit from extortion aligns the interests of Delaware legislators with
the interests of Delaware, and therefore supports the credibility of
Delaware's commitment to cater to the interests of its firms."s
III. DELAWARE'S LIBERAL(?) CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS
So far I have analyzed the conditions under which Sitkoffs thesis,
attributing Delaware legislators' weak extortion power to the fact that
no other interest group operates in Delaware, may be conceivable. I
have argued that Sitkoff's explanation may be valid only if interest
groups operating in other states compete with firms, in the sense that
rent extracted from firms is transferred to these groups, and only if
these competing groups enjoy significant voting power. Compared
with these states, Delaware enjoys a comparative advantage because
no competing interest groups reside and vote in Delaware.
But Sitkoff's theory has another element that, until this point, I
have ignored. Sitkoff argues that the fact that firms in Delaware are
allowed to contribute to legislators' campaigns, coupled with the weak
extortion power of Delaware legislators, allows firms to engage in
lobbying without the fear of being extorted. This, according to Sitkoff,
is an additional source of Delaware's attraction:
The combination of few competing bidders and the failure to dis-
criminate against corporate political speech lowers the cost of
47 See, for example, Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 273-81 (cited in note 31) (analyzing the
incentives of legal professionals involved in reincorporations and legal institutions with regard to
migrating firms).
48 This argument resembles Macey and Miller's explanation for Delaware's dominance.
See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 Tex L Rev 469, 471 (1987) ("A complete theory of Delaware corporate law
requires analysis of the ways in which the state's legal system responds to two broad constituent
groups: (1) the 'consumers' of Delaware corporate law (principally out-of-state shareholders and
managers); and (2) the interests within the state that stand to benefit in various ways from the
state's chartering system."). All my analysis adds to Macey and Miller's theory is that the fact
that the interest groups that reside and vote in Delaware want to sustain Delaware's dominance
also protects firms from extortion.
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[amending corporate law], if not by increasing the avenues
through which it might be purchased, then by offering a jurisdic-
tion in which reform may be sought without exposure to extor-
tionate demands. Put another way, Delaware's political dynamic
not only protects corporations from extortive threats, but it also
increases the odds of successfully agitating for legislative changes
to Delaware's corporate law without triggering a cascade of rent
extraction.49
I find this argument much more problematic than the previous
one. Once we relax the assumption that all firms want the same law
and we recognize the conflicts of interest between firms, we must also
recognize that under both McChesney's and Stigler's models, firms
should opt for a regime that bans contributions to campaigns of
Delaware legislators.Y In fact, this is the main point that Sitkoff makes
in Part II of his Article. Such bans become even more essential once
we recognize the conflicts of interest between shareholders and man-
agement. Like any other business decision, management has discretion
with regard to investment in lobbying. Managers may use this discre-
tion to lobby for laws that serve management's interest and harm
shareholders' interests. Thus, the argument that the liberal campaign
finance law makes Delaware attractive to shareholders seems unlikely.
Sitkoff is aware of this objection and dismisses it by citing evi-
dence showing that incorporating in Delaware improves shareholders'
wealth. But this reply is far from convincing. Evidence showing that
Delaware law increases shareholder value cannot provide any support
for Sitkoff's claim that this value stems from Delaware's liberal ap-
proach to campaign contributions.
An alternative argument that Sitkoff could raise (and did raise in
the pre-conference version of his Article) is that managers' opportun-
ism is not consistent with investors' rationality, because rational inves-
tors should have found ways to constrain such opportunism. Indeed,
rational investors recognize agency costs and deal with them by adopt-
ing contractual limitations on management's power, in particular on
management's power to amend these contractual limitations. By allow-
ing managers to lobby for corporate law amendments, however, Dela-
ware law allows managers to lobby for amendments that would over-
ride their contractual commitments. In this sense, and contrary to Sit-
koff's claim, there is a sharp distinction between management invest-
ment in rent seeking, which may be used to evade contractual limita-
tions, and its investment in charity, which is subject to such contractual
limitations. Arguably, Sitkoff may claim, if rent seeking by management
49 Sitkoff 69 U Chi L Rev at 1147 (cited in note 2).
50 See notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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were a major concern for (rational) investors, they would have forbid-
den management lobbying; the fact that (rational) investors do not
impose such limits suggests that they want firms to engage in lobbying.
But, as Sitkoff himself recognizes, such self-imposed limitations would
place a firm in a disadvantageous position in the market for legisla-
tion."
Sitkoff's reply may be convincing only if we endorse his previous
assumption, namely, that there are no significant conflicts of interest
between firms with regard to corporate law. But even under this as-
sumption it is not clear why firms would want to spend money and ef-
fort lobbying for legislation that serves the interests of all Delaware
corporations. Under this homogeneity assumption firms would prefer
free-riding, letting other firms spend their money on lobbying. Thus, if
we endorse the homogeneity assumptions, the strongest claim we can
make is that whereas on the federal level firms have a strong interest
in banning contributions, in Delaware firms would not spend money
on lobbying even if they were allowed to do so. Hence, Delaware firms
are not motivated to fight aggressively against Delaware's liberal
campaign finance law.
Lastly, I would argue that even if we ignore such conflicts of in-
terest, namely, if we assume management always lobbies on behalf of
the shareholders' interest, it is still not clear that shareholders would
opt for a regime that allows lobbying for corporate law amendments.
Shareholders want to be able to precommit to certain contractual
limitations on their power to amend the corporate charter and bylaws.
Such precommitments allow shareholders to ensure minority share-
holders, employees, creditors, and incumbent management that their
interests will be protected, thereby reducing the cost of establishing
contractual relationships with these third parties. If firms are allowed
to purchase amendments that serve the interests of the majority of
shareholders, the credibility of these precommitments would be lost.
We may conclude, therefore, that under all reasonable assump-
tions concerning conflicts of interests with regard to Delaware corpo-
rate law, there are reasons to believe that Delaware firms would pre-
fer to ban contributions to Delaware politicians. Arguably, such bans
do exist in Delaware. Although Sitkoff describes Delaware campaign
laws as liberal, in fact the same limitations on contributions that are
imposed on individuals are also imposed on firms. 2 Thus, the contribu-
tions that each Delaware firm is allowed to make are so trivial that,
arguably, they can be neglected.
51 Sitkoff 69 U Chi L Rev at 1112-13.
52 See note 15.
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IV. DELAWARE'S PROCEDURAL RESTRICTIONS ON CORPORATE
LAW AMENDMENTS
The second source of Delaware legislators' weakness that Sitkoff
identifies is the procedural limitation on Delaware legislators' power
in the area of corporate law. Sitkoff explains:
[T]he constitutional requirement in Delaware of a two-thirds
vote of both houses of the legislature to amend the General Cor-
poration Law also diminishes the credibility of extortive threats
generally and the likelihood of a divide-and-conquer strategy in
particular.5 3
The supermajority requirement clearly ensures stability in Dela-
ware corporate law, and this in itself, as Sitkoff points out, may be a
virtue. Less obvious is the argument that the two-thirds requirement
reduces extortion.
First, in states where corporate law can easily be amended by a
simple majority of legislators, the durability of the product legislators
can sell is much lower than that of the product Delaware legislators
are selling. Arguably, therefore, although Delaware legislators may
find it hard to convince firms that they can form the two-thirds coali-
tion (and obtain support from the bar) needed to support their threat,
firms know that if the threateners do elicit such support, it -will be
much more damaging than similar legislation in other states. Thus, al-
though the plausibility that Delaware legislators will be able to carry
out a threat to extract rents may be lower, the magnitude of the harm
Delaware legislators would inflict if they do so is much larger. The
price that Delaware legislators will be able to charge for each
amendment, therefore, should be much higher than the price legisla-
tors can charge in other states.
Second, while it is true that a two-thirds majority reduces the
power of each legislator to promote legislation, at the same time this
supermajority requirement increases the holdout power of each legis-
lator. Thus, if firms lobby for a corporate law amendment, the extor-
tion power of each legislator is much higher under this regime.-" The
argument that firms will be less extorted in such a regime, therefore,
relies heavily on firms' preference for the status quo. Firms' prefer-
ence for stagnation in the legislature can be explained not only by
53 Sitkoff, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1146 (cited in note 2).
54 In fact, if we ignore the extortion position that this veto power affords to legislators, it
seems other states could relatively easily mimic Delaware by adopting a two-thirds requirement
as well. The reason other states cannot adopt such a rule is that, where other interest groups op-
erate and vote, such a veto power increases the extortion power of legislators. Thus, in fact, the
potential for extortion that the two-thirds requirement generates is essential for Sitkoff's main
claim.
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their risk aversion,5 5 but also by their trust in the judiciary. The harder
it is to pass legislation, the broader the scope of judicial discretion and
judicial power to regulate corporate law.56 Thus, the fact that the legis-
lature is in stagnation does not necessarily mean that the law remains
stable-all it means is that the power to modify the law is in the judi-
ciary's hand. With an unreliable court in the background, therefore,
firms would have considered the supermajority requirement a burden
and a facilitator of extortion. Thus, the argument that a supermajority
requirement restricts extortion relates to the approach that attributes
Delaware's dominance to its professional judiciary."'
Lastly, the two-thirds majority seems to raise further impedi-
ments to Sitkoff's claim that firms find Delaware attractive because of
its liberal campaign finance laws and the safe environment Delaware
provides to lobbyists. The two-thirds majority requirement increases
significantly the costs of such lobbying, thereby sending firms a clear
message that the price of buying legislation in Delaware is far higher
than anywhere else. The fact that, in practice, the Delaware norm is
that amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law are con-
ditioned upon the Delaware bar's approval further suggests that
money cannot buy amendments to the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law. Thus, it seems the procedural limitations on corporate law
amendments may provide an additional explanation for why firms do
not fight aggressively against Delaware liberal campaign finance law,
but it can hardly provide support for Sitkoff's claim that the reason
firms prefer Delaware is that it enables them to buy off legislation.
V. SITKOFF VERSUS BEBCHUK AND FERRELL
The last stage in Sitkoffs Article is his criticism of Bebchuk and
Ferrell's call for a federal takeover law.9 The federal statute Bebchuk
55 Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 722 (cited in note 18):
While the [two-thirds] provision would appear to make future changes equally difficult, if
firms are risk averse when it comes to corporation codes, they might favor a maximin strat-
egy in which the constitutional provision would be desirable, since it helps to ensure that
the legal regime will never be worse than it is at the time of incorporation.
56 John Ferejohn and Barry Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 Intl
Rev L & Econ 263 (1992).
57 Romano, J L, Econ, & Org at 277 (cited in note 31) ("[Ihe continuity in and small size
of Delaware's chancery court, which hears corporation law cases, while facilitating the develop-
ment of judicial expertise in the field, also makes Delaware decisions more predictable than
those of other states.").
58 See Sitkoff 69 U Chi L Rev at 1148 n 190 (cited in note 2).
59 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 115-17 (cited in note 4) (proposing an optional
federal takeover law that would provide less protection to incumbent managers than current
state law, in addition to a mandatory procedural rule allowing shareholders to vote on whether
to opt in to the optional law).
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and Ferrell propose would not be mandatory, but rather, shareholders
would be able to pick this statute instead of the takeover law offered
to them by their state of incorporation. Bebchuk and Ferrell argue
that such a choice-enhancing federal law could not make matters
worse and only has the potential to improve the legal system. 6
Sitkoff disagrees: "The Bebchuk and Ferrell proposal would be a
'milker,' moreover, even if the substance of the proposed rules were to
be optional.... Federal legislators could simply threaten to make the
option mandatory."' In other words, what Sitkoff fears is that once
Congress adopts an optional federal takeover law, federal legislators
will threaten to turn it into a mandatory rule, only for the sake of ex-
torting those who oppose such a mandatory takeover regime.'2
Sitkoff's criticism does not spell out exactly how Bebchuk and
Ferrell's optional legislation would help legislators do something they
could do even in the absence of such legislation. After all, nothing is
stopping legislators from coming up with a proposal to amend the
federal mandatory regime of the Williams Act and add to it the same
provisions that Bebchuk and Ferrell want in their optional legisla-
tion.6' Alternatively, Congress could empower the SEC to regulate
management's conduct in the face of a takeover threat. Thus, Bebchuk
and Ferrell's proposal, assuming it is indeed optional, cannot be ac-
cused of helping federal legislators extort firms."
What Sitkoff really advocates has nothing to do with the Bebchuk
and Ferrell proposal, but rather is related to the constitutional separa-
tion of powers between the federal government and the states. As long
as there is no constitutional limitation on Congress's power to regulate
corporations in general and takeovers in particular, federal legislators
will be able to initiate such "milkers" irrespective of whether Bebchuk
and Ferrell's law is in place. Ideally, therefore, the Sitkoff constitution
would forbid the federal government from regulating takeovers. Only
such constitutional limitation on the central government's power could
constrain legislators' power to extort firms.
60 Id.
61 Sitkoff, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1163 (cited in note 2).
62 In fact, Sitkoff makes an even stronger claim: "Perversely, an optional statute might be
worse than a mandatory one, because it would allow these legislators to threaten credibly to
make it mandatory at a future time." Id. This claim is, of course, tautological. If optional laws are
indeed worse than mandatory laws because legislators can threaten to turn them into mandatory
rules, then mandatory rules are even worse than optional rules because legislators may threaten
to turn them into optional rules (which are worse than mandatory rules, etc.).
63 In the post-conference version of his Article Sitkoff tries to remedy this failure. See id at
1163-64 (cited in note 2).
64 Sitkoff may claim that the existence of optional legislation reduces the cost of threaten-
ing to introduce mandatory legislation because the threatener does not have to draft a whole bill.
But it seems the costs involved in drafting such a bill are trivial.
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Sitkoff also ignores the bright side of Bebchuk and Ferrell's pro-
posal. If, indeed, firms are bothered by extortion, the one area in
which they are most likely to be extorted is the area of takeovers. The
main refuge from extortion in this area is the firm's ability to reincor-
porate in a different state. Thus, any proposal that would reduce the
cost involved in such an exit would reduce the extortion power of
state legislators. If, indeed, under Bebchuk and Ferrell's optional
takeover law, firms would be able to opt out of their state takeover
code at a very low cost, the credibility of a state legislator's threat
would be significantly undermined. Thus, looking at the problem
solely from McChesney's and Sitkoff's perspective, it is not that obvi-
ous that the Bebchuk and Ferrell proposal should be rejected. Argua-
bly, the federal option would help firms to cope with threats emanat-
ing from state legislators.
Having said all this, I still think Sitkoff could raise a "McChesney
argument" against Bebchuk and Ferrell. The problem I identify in
Bebchuk and Ferrell's proposal, from Sitkoff's perspective, is that al-
though their legislation is optional, the option they write is mandatory
and it is up to the shareholders' sole discretion whether to exercise it.
Bebchuk and Ferrell, in their proposal, suggest that firms would be al-
lowed to opt out of the optional federal law, but they would be al-
lowed to do so only through a charter amendment.6' Thus, their pro-
posal is indeed optional for firms that will go public after the Bebchuk
and Ferrell law is enacted. However, for all the current universe of
publicly held corporations, the federal option would transfer rents
from management to shareholders. Managers would have to pay
shareholders for agreeing to opt out of the federal option. Bebchuk
and Ferrell may be right that such a transfer of rents is justified both
on efficiency and on distributive grounds.6 But the fact that their op-
tional legislation transfers rents suggests that shareholders and man-
agers would care a lot about the content of this option and, therefore,
federal legislators would be able to pit managers and shareholders
one against the other and extort both groups.6 Hence, from Sitkoff's
65 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 148 (cited in note 4):
If shareholders wished to opt out of the process rule itself; there is no reason why they
should not be allowed do so through a charter amendment. The process rule would only be
mandatory in the sense that regardless of state law, shareholders will have the option, if
they did not forego it in their charter, to have their corporation opt into or out of the fed-
eral takeover regime. The goal of the choice-enhancing intervention is to increase, not limit,
shareholder choice.
66 See id ("States, however, would not be allowed to opt out of the process rule through
their corporate law because states have not been willing to give shareholders meaningful choice
on whether they actually want certain takeover arrangements.").
67 To avoid this problem, Bebchuk and Ferrell should have adopted an opposite process,
according to which shareholders would be allowed to exercise the federal option only if the firm
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perspective, namely if our sole policy goal were to minimize legisla-
tors' opportunities to extort firms, we should have objected to
Bebchuk and Ferrell's proposal even if they could promise us that
federal legislators would never threaten to make it mandatory.
CONCLUSION
Sitkoff's main contribution lies in the introduction of McChes-
ney's rent extraction model to the debates on state competition for
corporate charters. Nothing in this Commentary was meant to down-
play the importance of this innovation. All this Commentary tries to
do is to clarify Sitkoff's argument and examine its limits.
The first claim I address in this Commentary is that Delaware's
dominance in the market for corporate charters may be explained by
the weak extortion position that Delaware legislators possess vis-A-vis
corporations. Whereas Sitkoff attributes this weakness to the fact that
legislators in Delaware have no other competing interest group to
turn to for contributions and to the homogenous preferences of
Delaware firms, this Commentary suggests that other interest groups
do operate in Delaware and firms do hold opposing views with regard
to the optimal corporate law. The main source for this weakness, ac-
cording to this Commentary, is the fact that unlike New York, Califor-
nia and similar states, the competing interest groups do not have vot-
ing power in Delaware. Unlike New York and California voters, who
have a strong interest in extracting rents from corporations, Delaware
voters have no such interest. Hence, threats by Delaware legislators to
extract rents are less credible.
Another source for Delaware legislators' weakness that Sitkoff
points at is the burdensome procedure that the Delaware constitution
and norms impose on corporate law amendment. Although I believe
this argument is valid, the third part of this Commentary has offered a
few caveats. I have argued that the constitution's requirement that any
amendment to the Delaware General Corporation Law must be sup-
ported by two-thirds of the legislature increases the veto power of leg-
islators and, therefore, increases their extortion power in cases in
which firms are interested in amending corporate law. Thus, Sitkoff's
claim assumes firms prefer the status quo. More accurately, limitations
on the legislature's power to amend corporate law empower the judi-
ciary. Hence, Sitkoff's claim relies heavily on firms' trust in Delaware's
judiciary. Without such trust, firms would often lobby for legislative
override of a court decision and, therefore, would be subject to the
amended its charter to opt into the federal option. But, of course, this process rule would under-
mine the main goal of Bebchuk and Ferrell's proposal-to allow shareholders to escape the
takeover arrangements that were imposed on them midstream by state legislators.
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significant veto power that Delaware legislators enjoy by virtue of the
two-thirds requirement. The trustworthiness of the Delaware judiciary,
therefore, is a precondition for Sitkoff's claim that the two-thirds re-
quirement reduces extortion.
In the second part of my Commentary I expressed my doubts
concerning Sitkoffs suggestion that firms find Delaware attractive be-
cause of its liberal campaign finance laws. Delaware's procedural re-
strictions on corporate law amendment, in the form of the two-thirds
requirement and the unofficial gatekeeper power of the Delaware bar,
makes lobbying in Delaware even less attractive. Hence, the argument
that Delaware liberal campaign finance law is a source of attraction, I
believe, is an exaggeration. It seems the best we can say about Dela-
ware's liberal campaign finance law is that it probably does not scare
firms away.
In the last part of my Commentary I addressed Sitkoffs criticism
of Bebchuk and Ferrell's proposal for an optional federal takeover
law. I agree with Sitkoff's argument that despite the optional nature of
the Bebchuk and Ferrell proposal, it might subject firms to extortion
threats coming from federal legislators, but my reasons are slightly dif-
ferent. Sitkoff's main criticism is that federal legislators would extort
firms by threatening to turn Bebchuk and Ferrell's optional law into a
mandatory law. I suggested that Bebchuk and Ferrell's proposal would
be a "milker" even if it were coupled with a strong commitment to
remain optional. The main reason for this is that Bebchuk and
Ferrell's proposal provides shareholders with an option they currently
do not have and, therefore, it transfers rents from management to
shareholders. Thus, managers and investors would have strong con-
flicting interests in the content of this option. Federal legislators would
be able to take advantage of this conflict and extort from both groups.
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